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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade there has been a resurgence of interest in the possibility of
some measure of devolution to regional governments for at least parts of the
United Kingdom. In Scotland, the debate has been particularly advanced, and
three of the four main political parties in Scotland are committed to substantial
devolution. As in the unsuccessful devolution proposals of 1979, the proposals
for Scotland are echoed by similar, though less unequivocal, devolution
proposals for Wales. Devolution in England has attracted less enthusiasm, and
much less vigorous debate, except in a few regions, notably the North East.
Regional government raises a number of finance questions, which are the
subject of this paper. The issue of finance has been most prominent in the debate
over devolution in Scotland, with intense interest focusing on, at one extreme,
the fiscal position of Scotland if it were wholly dependent on Scottish tax
revenues to finance Scottish expenditures, and, at the other extreme, on the
adequacy and/or effects of giving a Scottish Parliament power to vary income
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tax rates within a three percentage point band. There has been much less
discussion of other finance issues.
This paper aims to contribute to a discussion of the appropriate basis for
financing regional government in the UK.
2 Section II provides a brief overview
of the regional structure of governance in the UK at present. A central theme of
the paper, set out in Section III, is that financing questions cannot be considered
independently of the purpose that regional government is intended to serve. The
role envisaged for regional governments will determine both the scale of the
resources they require and the extent to which they, themselves, should exercise
control over the level of resources they receive. Following on from this
discussion, Sections IV and V then consider issues concerning the financing of
regional government through fiscal transfers from central government and
through regional taxes, respectively. A concluding section summarises a number
of key issues.
Before embarking on the main analysis, a number of preliminary observations
should be made.
First, there are many aspects of the debate over regional government that do
not concern issues of economics. Perceptions of national identity, for example,
are an important element in the debate over Scottish or Welsh devolution.
Political strategy and political calculation — the question of `what the electorate
will accept’ — will obviously determine the proposals that are brought forward
and the shape of any system of regional government that thus emerges. However,
in the design and financing of a system of regional government, there are also
issues of economic substance at stake, and not just issues of political strategy or
attitude, and it is these that we address in this paper.
Second, there are a range of possibilities. This paper is not a description or
costing of a single scheme, but a discussion of issues common to some (though
by no means all) of the arrangements for decentralisation that might be
contemplated.
Third, the development of regional government may well happen gradually.
The Constitution Unit’s (1996a) study of regional government outlines one
possible process for regional government in England, moving through a system
of regional Chambers to regional Assemblies. It is only at the latter point that
significant financial resources would be required. Even then, the level of finance
needed would depend on the scale of devolution envisaged for the major
spending functions — health, education, etc.
Fourth, devolution to regional governments may also be an uneven process.
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Scotland may move sooner and faster than other parts of the UK, and, within
England, some schemes for regional government would make the move to
regional Assemblies contingent on a region voting in favour.
3 Financial
arrangements may thus need to cope with uneven regionalisation. Also, finance
may have a considerable impact on the decision-making regarding the transfer
from Chambers to Assemblies. There are, as we discuss later, some important
requirements for a system of regional government finance, if fiscal gains and
losses from regionalisation are not to have a major bearing on the pattern of
regional interests in moving towards greater decentralisation.
II. REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND FINANCING
As well as elected central and local tiers of government, the UK already has a
certain amount of decentralisation in the existing organisation of central
government. The extent of the responsibilities exercised by this regional tier
varies between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
4
Within Scotland and Wales, the Scottish and Welsh Offices, respectively, are
responsible for many of the major responsibilities of central government, such as
health, industrial policy and overseeing local government responsibilities such as
education and social services. One major difference is that Home Office
functions are devolved to the Scottish Office but not to the Welsh Office.
Within England, regional governance is more diverse and does not conform
to a simple pattern of standard regions. A network of 10 ‘Government Offices
for the Regions’ was established in April 1994 to co-ordinate the regional
dimensions of expenditure for a number of central government departments.
These are responsible for the work previously carried out by the regional offices
of the Departments of the Environment,
5 Transport, Employment, and Trade and
Industry. The establishment of these offices was intended to co-ordinate the
regional agencies of central government departments rather than to decentralise
additional central government functions.
Many central government responsibilities are carried out on its behalf by
decentralised single-service agencies. Some of these have a regional dimension,
most notably in the case of the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). The
regional boundaries used by such decentralised agencies often differ. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency bases its regions on water basins
rather than on standard regions, and Greater London is served by two Regional
Health Authorities
6 but one Integrated Regional Office. Alongside the
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decentralised agencies of central government, there are also a number of English
Regional Associations of local authorities, which are voluntary bodies aiming to
facilitate regional co-operation and co-ordination between authorities. Their
main activities include regional planning, transport, waste and economic
development. The level of activity of these bodies varies between regions, with
that for the North of England being particularly active.
III. OPTIONS FOR DEVOLUTION
The Constitution Unit’s recent study of options for regional government in
England observes that `a workable and durable regional tier requires clear
analysis of the reasons why it is to be established and the role and functions it is
to perform’ (Constitution Unit, 1996a, p. 6). The study sets out both
‘democratic’ and ‘functional’ reasons for the establishment of regional
government. In the former category, it includes arguments that regional identity
requires democratic recognition, that regional government might provide an
outlet for political expression in parts of the country where the national
governing party commands little support, and that the existing administrative
layer of regional agencies needs democratic supervision at regional level. The
latter category includes certain functions (strategic land-use planning, transport,
economic development, and co-ordinating bids for and management of EU-
funded projects) whose effective operation needs areas larger than local
authorities but smaller than England as a whole.
The study also reviews a range of possible institutional arrangements for
some measure of regional government in England. The possibilities include a
regional parliamentary assembly of MPs (along the lines of the Scottish Grand
Committee), a confederation of local authorities, a directly-elected assembly, or
a body based on the merger of existing regional bodies (police, health, regional
quangos, etc.). It concludes that the two most promising models would be either
regional ‘Chambers’ or regional ‘Assemblies’. Regional Chambers would
provide a forum in which delegates from local authorities could co-ordinate the
region-wide aspects of local government functions; they could constitute an
interim stage to more comprehensive regional government or be permanent
institutions in their own right. Regional Assemblies would be directly elected,
and might have more extensive functions, involving the possible transfer of some
significant spending responsibilities from central government.
Scottish and Welsh devolution could involve similar arrangements, although
some proposals for Scotland go considerably further. Thus, for example, the
Constitution Unit’s parallel study of arrangements for a possible Scottish
Parliament includes control of all the expenditure functions currently exercised
by the Scottish Office, together with some measure of taxation powers, in the
form of scope to vary the rate of income tax within a given range (Constitution
Unit, 1996b).Format of Fiscal Studies articles
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The appropriate basis for financing regional government will depend in part
on prior decisions concerning its scale and the expenditure functions that are
allocated to the regional level. Regional Chambers, operating to co-ordinate the
policies of local authorities, may spend little and have correspondingly little
need for financial resources. They could be financed by much more
straightforward arrangements than those that might be appropriate for
institutions with more extensive spending powers. One implication of this, if (as
much of the discussion seems to assume) different levels of devolution would be
appropriate for Scotland, Wales and the English regions (and, indeed, possibly
with differences between the English regions, too), is that the financial
arrangements that would be appropriate for regional government may well not be
uniform across the UK as a whole.
Whether regional government needs to be able to levy its own tax revenues
also depends on the fundamental role that regional government is intended to
perform. In particular, there is a difference between regional government
institutions intended to perform a ‘choice’ function and those with an ‘agency’
function. Although in both cases these might be democratic institutions, perhaps
based on directly-elected Assemblies,
7 the scope of the decision-making powers
of the Assembly would be fundamentally different, and consequently the need
for regional taxes would be different, for each case.
In the former case, regional government would be intended to make it
possible for regional voters to determine the standard of public service provision
in their region; where regional voters demand higher-quality services than the
national standard, for example, these could be implemented. For this to be
possible — and for the decision to have higher-quality services to be made in the
light of the costs of higher quality — it is desirable that the region should be
responsible for raising the resources for higher-quality services through taxes on
its residents.
It is not easy to identify major areas of central government spending where
there is a strong demand, currently unmet, for differentiated standards of
provision across regions. It is far from clear that there is great support for
differentiated standards of, say, health, education or social services across the
English regions.
8 There is, perhaps, a larger group of public services, currently
provided by local government, where it would be feasible to permit a greater
degree of discretion in service provision if these services were provided at
regional level rather than at the current, local, level. These could include local
services where a significant proportion of the benefits accrues to residents
outside the authority concerned; such spillover effects are liable to be given
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inadequate weighting in local decisions. Examples of services with significant
spillover effects might include land-use planning, transport, cultural policy and,
in some areas, the police. Moving such services upwards to the regions might
then allow them to be operated without as much limitation on decentralised
choices as at present, since the decision-making area would comprise a greater
proportion of those affected. It is possible, therefore, that a considerable
proportion of the ‘choice’ functions that might be given to regional governments
might be transferred from local government rather than devolved from the centre.
In the ‘agency’ model, regional decisions are more constrained and the need
for regional taxes is less. National standards of provision may be set by central
government, and the purpose of having regional government may not be to allow
regions to choose to depart from these standards. Regional elections function, in
this case, not as an opportunity for regions to make differentiated choices, but as
a control device allowing regional voters the opportunity to demand efficient
performance from the regional bodies charged with implementing centrally-
determined policies (Helm and Smith, 1989). Whether regional elections would
function as a more efficient control device than the arrangements for
administrative monitoring of nationally-provided services will probably depend
on the particular field of policy concerned. The control function is likely to be
more effective in the case of high-profile services, where service quality can
easily be monitored and where there is little disagreement about basic objectives,
and may be correspondingly weak in less prominent areas, especially those
where there is major disagreement between regional voters and the central
government about the underlying aims of policy.
These models are, of course, a simplification of the complex roles that
decentralised government institutions would, in practice, play. However, it is
perhaps too readily assumed that the purpose of government decentralisation is
represented by the choice model, and that the purpose of decentralisation is
negated by elements of central control. It is clear that, in the post-war period,
local government in the UK has increasingly come to perform the `agency’ role
described, rather than the ‘choice’ role, and it is conceivable that a similar role
could be envisaged for regional government. Regional governments would then
determine how money is spent, not how much is spent.
IV. FINANCE THROUGH GRANTS FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
1. Own Taxes or Block Grants?
A need for regional tax revenues will arise only in certain circumstances — in
particular, where the regional authority is intended to have the power to make
independent decisions about the level of public service provision. For financing
other types of regional government — and, indeed, as a major source of revenuesFormat of Fiscal Studies articles
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even for those authorities with the power to vary service provision — financial
transfers from central government have some strong attractions.
The Case for Grants
Financial transfers — ‘block grants’ — have the merit of simplicity and low cost
in administration. In contrast, most arrangements for decentralisation of tax-
raising powers carry with them additional economic costs, including both extra
work in collection and enforcement and additional economic ‘distortions’ of
various sorts when different jurisdictions choose to set different tax rates.
Block grants may also be used to achieve equity between regions, reflecting
differences in their expenditure needs or in their tax-raising powers. This could,
of course, be done without central-to-region transfers, by making ‘horizontal’
transfers of revenue between regional governments. However, it is possible that,
in practice, such arrangements would prove rather less durable than equalisation
through differentiated transfers from the central government. Horizontal
transfers involve more transparent redistribution and may become a focus of
resentment in the areas that are net contributors.
Of course, financing regional governments largely, or exclusively, from
resources provided by central government may also be seen as advantageous by
central government, since it would allow it to keep full control of the aggregate
level of regional spending. As with central government control over local
authority expenditure aggregates, it is far from clear that there is any good
reason, based on either macroeconomic or microeconomic considerations, for
central government to do this. However, in practice, central government may not
wish to establish a system of regional governments that cedes a considerable
amount of control over aggregate public spending to the new governments, and
grant finance may be the easiest way to keep the new tier of government on a
tight leash, with minimal spending autonomy.
The Case for Taxes
If regional governments are intended to be able to determine the level of public
spending in their area, rather than simply to determine the allocation of a budget
fixed by central government, they would need to have some source of tax
revenues under their own control. Regional taxes would promote both
independence and accountability in regional government’s spending decisions.
Independence may be enhanced where regional governments derive a large
amount of their total revenues from local taxes. If regional governments were to
be largely dependent on a financial allocation from central government for the
resources to finance their spending, central government would have considerable
opportunity to influence the policy decisions of regional governments through
the terms on which the financial allocation was paid.Fiscal Studies
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This influence could be exerted explicitly if, for example, central government
made the payment of all or part of the grant conditional on certain actions of the
regional government. Likewise, a system of ‘matching’ grants, where central
government offers to pay a given percentage of the cost if the region incurs
certain expenditures, might have a large influence over the behaviour of the
regions.
More generally, even where the financial transfer was made, in principle, in
the form of a block grant, without explicit conditions on how it could be used,
the regions’ dependence on the block grant might make it possible for central
government to induce changes in regional governments’ behaviour merely
through the threat of changes in grant level or regional distribution.
Accountability in regional governments’ decisions about the level of
spending is generally a matter of the relationship between spending and taxation
at the margin. If regional voters are to weigh decisions about extra service
quality against the costs of its provision, it is necessary that extra spending is
paid for by extra taxes on the region’s residents, and that national taxpayers, or
residents of other regions, are not asked to foot the bill for a region’s decision to
spend more. This does not necessarily require that, overall, regional spending is
financed entirely through regional taxes; the bulk of regional spending could,
indeed, be financed by block grants from central government. The key
requirement for accountability concerns the relationship between tax and
spending at the margin, i.e. that extra regional spending results in extra regional
tax.
Assigned Revenues
In some countries, regional governments are partly financed through ‘assigned’
or ‘shared’ taxes. In the former case, the revenues from some taxes controlled by
central government are assigned in their entirety to regional government. In the
latter case, regional governments have an entitlement to some proportion of the
total revenues derived from a particular tax. In both cases, the ultimate
responsibility for setting tax rates lies with the central government. However, the
revenues from the assigned tax, and a fixed proportion of revenues from the
shared tax, accrue to regional government as of right.
These arrangements may superficially appear different from regional
government finance based solely on central transfers, but they offer little or no
difference in economic substance. Where the regions do not have power to
control the tax rate, they do not gain the autonomy that would come from having
a tax source under their own control. Moreover, assigned or shared taxes may
provide regions with little protection from arbitrary, or politically-motivated,
fluctuations in their financial entitlement. Although the pace of growth of
revenue from the assigned tax would be governed by the growth of the assigned
tax base, this would only guarantee a change in the revenues available to theFormat of Fiscal Studies articles
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regions if they were receiving no grants from central government. Where regions
receive both assigned tax revenues and central grant, central government can
offset changes in the revenues from the assigned tax through corresponding
adjustments to any grant that it still pays to the regions, leaving the total revenue
available to regions unaffected by the change in the assigned tax base.
It should be observed that similar objections apply to a system where regions
might be provided with a tax base nominally under their full control, but where
economic pressures give them no power to increase the tax rate in practice. Thus,
for example, if regional governments were given the power to precept on the
local authority (council tax) base, this would be unlikely to give regions any real
financial autonomy, since the tax rates levied on this rather narrow and
unsophisticated tax base are already high.
2. Equalisation of ‘Needs’ and ‘Resources’
Financial transfers from central government to regional governments to finance
all or part of the regions’ spending could be paid on a straightforward per capita
basis: each region would receive grant equal to its population multiplied by the
grant amount per capita. Where the functions of regional government involve
very limited levels of spending (as perhaps in the case of the regional Chambers
discussed by the Constitution Unit), it may be possible to consider a simple
financing formula of this sort. However, if regional government is to take over
any of the major public expenditure functions currently exercised by central or
local government, per capita financing would be liable to provide some regions
with inadequate financial resources to maintain the current level of regional
spending, whilst others would be over-resourced compared with current
spending.
Table 1 illustrates this point. It shows official figures for the regional and
territorial pattern of per capita public spending in the UK in 1993-94, presented
in relation to per capita spending in England as a whole. The figures are derived
from an annual Treasury exercise to allocate ‘general government expenditure’
(the combined spending of central and local government) between regions and
territories. They aim to reflect where the benefit from public spending falls,
rather than where the money is spent; in the case of some spending (such as on
defence, overseas aid, etc.), the benefits do not accrue to an identifiable part of
the UK, and no regional allocation is therefore made. About three-quarters of
general government expenditure is allocated between England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland in the Treasury’s figures; a rather lower proportion of
spending in England is then allocated to a specific region. It should be borne in
mind in interpreting the figures in Table 1 that, because of this difference, the
figures for the division of spending between territories (i.e. between England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) are not strictly comparable with those for
the allocation between English regions.Fiscal Studies
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Table 1 indicates that there is considerable variation in per capita public
spending between England, Scotland and Wales: total per capita spending in
Wales and Scotland exceeds spending in England by almost one-fifth and one-
quarter, respectively. There is also some (though rather less) variation in per
capita spending across the English regions. These spending differences are
shown in relation to regional GDP in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows that per capita
social security spending tends to be high where unemployment is high. The
regional and territorial variation in other spending categories may also be — at
least partly — driven by the application of uniform national policies to areas
where the `need’ for spending varies.
9
                                                                                                                                   
9 However, it is not clear that all the variation in per capita spending shown in Figures 1 and 2 can be
satisfactorily explained in this way. Whilst it should be stressed that the figures for per capita spending in the
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FIGURE 1
Per Capita GDP, and Per Capita ‘Identified’ (Territories) and ‘Allocated’ (English
Regions) Spending, 1993-94
Sources: tables7.5B and 7.9, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 1996-97, Cm 3201, HM Treasury, March
1996: Table 12.1, Regional Trends, 1996 edition, Office for National Statistics.
‘Equalisation’ in the grant allocation to regional government could be used to
reflect differences between the regions in terms of their expenditure
requirements. The amount of grant to be paid to a region would then vary
according to an assessment of each region’s ‘need’ to spend on the services
assigned to the regional level.
Also, where the regional government is assigned certain taxes to cover some
part of regional expenditures, the pattern of grant payments might be
differentiated to take account of per capita variation in taxable resources.
Equalisation of this sort, to compensate for differences in regional
governments’ spending needs or taxable resources, would be consistent with the
way in which financial resources are allocated to local authorities in the UK. The
allocation of the local authority block grant reflects an estimate by central
government of the expenditure required to maintain a standard level of local
services in each area (the `Standard Spending Assessment’ or SSA).
10 Grant is
                                                                                                                                   
higher levels of service need in the North of England. In 1993, for example, the unemployment rate was 11.9
per cent in the North of England and 9.7 per cent in Scotland, while per capita GDP was 12.1 per cent below
the average for England in the North of England and 3.2 per cent below the average for England in Scotland.
10 The pattern of spending `needs’ across regions may be harder to assess than that across local authorities,
since there are many fewer regions than local authorities. With only 11 regions, the regression analysis
techniques used to estimate the determinants of spending could only include a handful of needs indicators as



























































































































































































allocated to each local authority on a basis that aims to ensure that each could
offer this standard level of service at the same level of council tax; the grant thus
offsets both differences in tax base (the average council tax valuation) and
differences in local service needs (due to differences in the structure of the
population, area, etc.).
FIGURE 2
Unempl;oyment and Per Capita ‘Identified’ (Territories) and ‘Allocated’ (English
Regions) Social Security Spending, 1993-94
Sources: tables7.5B and 7.9, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 1996-97, Cm 3201, HM Treasury, March
1996: Table 5.18, Regional Trends, 1996 edition, Office for National Statistics.
Reasons for Equalisation
A case could be made for similar equalisation in the allocation of resources to
regional governments, on at least three grounds:
•   First, some amount of equalisation may be seen as simply a matter of
‘fairness’ in the treatment of different regions. Without equalisation, living
standards will be affected by demographic and other pressures on public
spending and the tax- raising potential of each region. Residents of poor
regions, with high spending needs and little scope for raising tax revenues,
will face a greater regional tax burden than similar people living in richer
areas, where there is less pressure on public services and more potential for
raising tax revenues.
•   Second, equalisation may prevent fiscally-induced migration. Without
equalisation, `rich’ regions, with a large tax base and/or little need for
                                                                                                                                   
public spending patterns and needs were available, and if the subregional spending pattern could be believed to


























































































































































































80 80Format of Fiscal Studies articles
111
spending, can set lower tax rates and/or offer higher-standard services than
`poor’ regions. This may encourage some businesses and individuals to move
into the rich region, where they would benefit from the lower taxes and/or
higher-standard services. These movements, purely for fiscal reasons, may
lead to costs of inefficient location.
11 They could also lead to a growing fiscal
divergence between regions, as those with the lowest tax rates attract more
taxpayers, allowing them to reduce tax rates still further.
•   Third, a commitment to equalisation may help in the process of defining
regions and decentralising government functions. Where there is full
equalisation of both needs and resources, all regions face the same fiscal
`opportunities’: the grant system ensures that no region is in a better or worse
fiscal position than any other. From the point of view of a particular area, the
`wealth’ of the other areas in the region does not affect the fiscal position of
the region as a whole (although it could, of course, affect party political
control and the policy choices the region would make). Choosing the
boundaries of the regions does not, therefore, carry the same fiscal
significance as when regions are dependent on their own resources. Without
full equalisation, on the other hand, the definition of the regional boundaries
would have clear fiscal implications: there would be a strong incentive for
areas to try to escape from poor regions into a rich region through a
redrawing of the regional boundary.
•   This argument for equalisation is probably of most significance where regions
are arbitrarily defined, and may matter less where regional boundaries are
based on historical or natural boundaries commanding general consent. It is
therefore probably of more significance between the English regions, where
the boundaries may not command any great consensus, than between the
territories of the UK. Even if there were a marked fiscal advantage or
disadvantage from being included in Wales or Scotland rather than in one of
the neighbouring English regions, it is unlikely that there would be much
pressure for the boundary to be changed. The same is unlikely to be true of
the boundary between, say, the South East and the West Midlands if, for
example, Oxfordshire were to be much better off by being placed in the
former rather than the latter region.
                                                                                                                                   
11 Some migration may be efficient, where, for example, it reflects different preferences for public spending.
Thus an individual with above-average preferences for public services may choose to move to an area with
above-average standards of provision, even if it also has a higher tax burden. In this case, or in other cases of
‘benefit taxation’ (where tax payments closely proxy benefits received), migration may help to obtain a better
match between preferences and service provision; the problems arise when taxes do not closely proxy
individual benefits received.Fiscal Studies
112
V. REGIONAL TAXATION
1. Criteria for Regional Taxes
If regional governments are to be given their own sources of tax revenues, what
taxes would it be most appropriate to assign to them? Table 2 summarises the
revenues derived from the main UK taxes.
Some of the key issues in assessing the merits of possible regional taxes are
set out below. Since we are considering the transfer of existing taxes to regional
government, rather than the establishment of new taxes, the relevant questions
concern the implications of transfer, such as the efficiency effects of permitting
rates to vary and the administrative costs incurred in attributing yields to
particular regions, rather than the overall merits of these three taxes. The
question, in other words, is `what does regionalisation add to the costs of raising
tax revenues?’.
•   Efficiency Would regionalising a particular tax, such that different rates of
tax might be set by different regions, be liable to increase the dead-weight
burden of raising tax revenues, over and above the level with a uniform
national tax rate? Would regional tax differences distort the pattern of private
sector economic activity across regions?
•   Administrative feasibility and cost. For each regional tax, is it possible to
devise workable arrangements for regions to set tax rates and for tax revenuesFormat of Fiscal Studies articles
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to be allocated to the region from which they are derived? Also, how much
does regionalisation add to its costs of assessment and collection, and to the
costs and effectiveness of enforcement activities? Almost inevitably,
operating a tax on a regional basis will increase the costs of administration —
there are distinctions to be drawn between taxpayers and economic activity
according to their location, which may require new information to be
collected and processed. However, these additional administrative costs are
likely to vary between taxes.
•   Budgetary aspects. It is desirable that regional taxes should have reasonably
stable and predictable revenues, especially if regional governments have only
a limited number of tax instruments and are not able to borrow freely to cover
any shortfall of revenue.
•   ‘Accountability’ properties. The amount of the tax and the government
authority responsible for levying it should be clearly perceived by taxpayers,
and the incidence of the tax should be broadly distributed across the regions’
taxpayers.
•   The need for equalisation. If the regional tax base is unevenly distributed
across areas, larger equalisation payments may be required to equalise the
taxable resources of different regions.
•   Equity. Few issues of `fairness’ or equity are raised by the transfer of a
central government tax to regional government. Regardless of the
distributional incidence of the regional tax, if its rate remains the same as that
previously levied by central government then the overall distribution of
income will be unaffected by transferring the tax to regional level. The only
issue — and it is probably a relatively minor one — concerns the
distributional impact of significant changes from the average, or initial, tax
rate, if the region were to choose to depart from the rate previously levied by
central government. Where the regional tax is highly regressive, for example,
the additional burden of local taxation to finance higher regional public
spending might be unduly borne by poorer households.
•   Impact on the financial resources available to other levels of government If
regional government taxes a base (for example, income) shared with central
government, the income tax rates set by either level of government could, in
principle, adversely affect the other level, by reducing the size of the base
available for it to tax. The regions, or central government, might be tempted
to push the income tax rate beyond the point that would maximise their joint
revenues, since their concern would be only with the extent to which they lost
revenues through a reduction in the tax base, and not with the revenue loss
experienced by the other tier of government. Destructive inter-tier
interactions of this sort may be limited by relatively simple measures — for
example, by placing an upper limit on the regional income tax rate —
although these measures may themselves have costs in terms of diminished
independence and accountability of local government.Fiscal Studies
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On the basis of these criteria, we suggest that there are three main candidates
for a regional tax, each of which would be comparatively easy to allocate to
regions, would be capable, if required, of raising significant amounts of revenue
and would have a broadly stable and predictable yield. These three candidates
for a regional tax are income tax, VAT (or, more generally, a sales tax) and a
regional assignment of the national non-domestic rate (`business rates’).
2. A Regional Income Tax
In many respects, the best available candidate for a regional tax is income tax.
Income tax raises substantial revenues — nearly £70 billion in 1995-96 — and
even assignment of only part of income tax to regional government could
provide regional authorities with considerable revenues and genuine scope to
influence their level of resources through taxation.
How would a regional income tax measure up against the various criteria for
regional taxation set out above? Particular issues arise in relation to three of the
criteria.
•   Efficiency. A regional income tax levied at a rate fixed by residence might
induce some population movements towards areas with low tax rates. These
tax- induced migrations would be likely to be limited (except, perhaps, for
high- income individuals), for two reasons. First, many people will have
reasons to stay in a particular higher-tax region, despite the difference in
taxation compared with other areas; these reasons may include employment
opportunities, family ties and preferences for particular locations. Second, the
gains from migration may be reduced by offsetting changes in house prices.
Since the stock of housing is largely fixed except in the very long term, a
higher demand for housing in low- tax areas would bid up house prices in
those areas; as a result, the gains from migration would be reduced.
The extent of migration could be further limited by appropriate design of
the regional income tax system. First, provisions for tax-base equalisation
would prevent tax differences arising because of the divergence in per capita
tax base between areas. Second, the tax saving that rich individuals could
make by moving to low-tax regions could be `capped’ by confining the power
of regions to set the level of taxation to the basic rate of income tax; the
system would then have regionally-varying basic rates of income tax, but a
single national higher rate. Third, it might be appropriate to limit the regions’
choice of income tax rates within a defined range — such as, for example,
plus or minus two percentage points around the existing national rate.
•   Administration. Proposals for a local income tax in the UK have, in the
past, had to confront a number of practical administrative difficulties. Many
of these difficulties arose from the particular features of the UK national
income tax system, which makes extensive use of deduction-at-sourceFormat of Fiscal Studies articles
115
arrangements to achieve an exact deduction of tax without the need for any
contact between the tax authorities and the vast majority of taxpayers. It was
not clear that tax rates varying according to a taxpayer’s place of residence
within the UK could be easily accommodated within this system, without
substantial extra burdens on employers (who might have had to handle
different rates of deduction for many different districts) and problems of
administrative complexity in linking the deductions made on various forms of
unearned income to individual taxpayers (Layfield Committee, 1976; Kay
and Smith, 1988; Isaac, 1992).
Many of these administrative problems have been substantially eased by
changes to the national income tax system, including the extensive
computerisation of taxpayer records and the move to self-assessment. Some
(including, perhaps, the burden on employers) would also be eased by the
smaller number of different tax rates involved in a system of regional income
tax, as opposed to local income tax.
It would still be necessary for a regional income tax to involve some
form of taxpayer residence declaration, and for this to be processed and
enforced. The difficulties experienced with poll tax registration might suggest
that this could be problematic. However, as Kay and Smith (1988) note, there
are important differences that should make the process more straightforward
for income tax. Many of the difficult cases for poll tax have negligible
incomes and therefore are not involved in income tax registration. Also, the
nature of the process involved differs: the process of allocating a given list of
national income taxpayers between areas has a defined end point, whilst poll
tax registration involved looking for an unknown number of individuals in
each area.
It would also be necessary to decide how far the existing deduction-at-
source arrangements would reflect regional variations in tax rates. It would be
possible to operate with a single rate of deduction at source from labour
incomes, but at the price of introducing an end-year adjustment of underpaid
or overpaid tax, reflecting the difference between the regional tax rate and the
rate of source deduction; this would involve much more extensive contact
between taxpayers and the Inland Revenue than there is currently. It would
also be possible to avoid introducing complexity into the arrangements for
deduction at source on investment incomes, if the regionally-varying tax rate
were only to apply to labour incomes; a system of this sort was, for example,
advocated by Kay and Smith (1988) for local income tax.
•   Accountability. A regional income tax could be made highly perceptible
— for example, by separately identifying the regional component in income
tax assessments and requiring employers to identify the regional component
in payroll deduction statements. Also, the burden of income tax payments is
spread reasonably widely through the population, whilst at the same time not
so widely that some form of rebating would be required to avoid an excessiveFiscal Studies
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tax burden on poor households. Although there are some voters in regional
elections who would not be income taxpayers, and who would therefore not
perceive any `accountability’ constraint on their voting behaviour through the
regional income tax, these are, in the main, individuals whose payments of
any regional tax would need to be low unless they were to experience undue
hardship.
3. A Regional Sales Tax
Like a regional income tax, a regional sales tax would raise particular issues
concerning efficiency, administration and accountability.
•    Efficiency. Regional differences in sales tax rates could distort the
geographical pattern of consumer spending and retail activity. Individuals
might make ‘cross- border’ shopping trips to neighbouring regions with lower
sales tax rates, and, over time, there might be a tendency for some retail
businesses, such as superstores, to move to areas where tax rates are lower.
To the extent that these developments simply reflect the tax advantage of
low-tax regions, they involve economic inefficiency.
These distortions in consumer spending and retail activity are, however,
likely to be small, so long as sales tax rates do not vary by more than a few
percentage points between regions. With small differentials in tax rates, the
saving from shopping in another region is unlikely to cover the additional
time and travel costs, except for certain large, high-value purchases and for
consumers living very close to the boundary between regions.
•   Administration. A fully-integrated system of regionally-varying VAT
would be complex to administer. The most practical option would be a
supplementary retail sales tax, over and above existing national VAT. This
would apply only at the point of sale to final consumers. It could be
integrated closely with existing VAT administrative procedures and
accounting, and could, for example, use common definitions of taxpayers and
tax base. However, unlike VAT, it would be necessary for taxpayers to
distinguish between sales to final consumers and sales to other businesses
(and for the tax authorities to enforce this distinction); these would be new
operations that would increase administration and compliance costs, and the
creation of a new ‘tax boundary’ between untaxed sales to businesses and
taxed sales to final consumers would create some new possibilities for
evasion (Hall and Smith, 1995).
•   Accountability. A regional sales tax would probably be less perceptible
than an income tax at regional level, if the tax burden were simply
incorporated into product prices. On the other hand, the burden of a regional
sales tax would be distributed more widely across the population than the
burden of a regional income tax.Format of Fiscal Studies articles
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A final issue concerns the compatibility of a regional sales tax with EU rules.
The Sixth VAT Directive places considerable limits on the design and operation
of indirect taxes in member states, and other EU agreements place some limits
on the rates that member states can levy. The need to secure agreement from
other EU member states for modifications to these rules might be seen as an
obstacle to a regional sales tax.
4. A Regional Business Rate
Business rates — a tax on the ‘rateable’ value of business premises — raised
£13.6 billion in 1995-96, about 5 per cent of total fiscal receipts. Although they
are administered by local government, a uniform tax rate is set nationally and the
revenues are pooled and distributed to local authorities in proportion to their
population.
Business rates would have some important advantages as a regional tax. The
tax base is fairly immobile, evasion is relatively difficult and it would be very
simple to allocate the tax base, and the revenues collected, to individual regional
authorities. However, as a possible regional tax, business rates have two major
— and probably overriding — drawbacks. The first is that regional business rate
differentials could affect business location decisions, and the second concerns
accountability.
•   Efficiency. Business activity might tend to gravitate towards low-rate areas,
leading to inefficiency in business location and possibly to an increasing
divergence between the tax bases available to different areas.
Evidence on the scale of such locational distortions from the pre-1990
period, when business rates varied between local authorities, is somewhat
mixed. Bennett (1986) shows that rate differentials led to considerable
differences in the potential profitability of locating an investment in different
areas. On the other hand, there is little systematic statistical evidence that
business rates actually distorted the location of business investment and
employment, though this may be partly because the long time scale over
which such effects would arise makes it difficult for the available techniques
to detect any effects that do arise (Denny, Hall and Smith, 1995).
•   Accountability. The burden of business rates is not ‘transparent’: it may
be `passed on’, in whole or in part, to the employees of the business in the
form of lower wages, or to customers through higher prices, or to landlords in
the form of lower property rents. These people may be unaware of how these
costs arise. They may also not live in the area of the authority imposing the
rate. As a result, the region’s electors would not face taxes reflecting the full
cossts of their voting decisionsFiscal Studies
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5. Conclusions on Regional Taxes
Whilst income tax, sales tax and non-domestic rates are all potential sources of
revenue for a regional tier of government, the choice between them would
depend on how much weight is attached to each of the criteria listed above. A
regional income tax seems to be the strongest candidate, since it would be
relatively easy to operate and equitable, and could be made easily perceptible to
residents. On the downside, tax yields would be strongly pro-cyclical, and
accountability would be limited for poorer households which would not pay any
tax. A regional sales tax might have a less cyclical yield but could cause
economic distortions through `cross-border’ shopping. It would be less easily
perceived and might involve a greater additional administration and compliance
burden than a regional income tax. The introduction of a regional business rate
would involve the least administrative burden but would limit accountability,
since the incidence of the tax is unclear and the distribution of the tax base is
highly uneven, suggesting that complex equalisation arrangements would be
necessary.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Many of the arrangements for regional government that might be envisaged for
the UK would raise no significant issues concerning finance. For example,
regional Chambers, which would provide a forum for local authorities to co-
ordinate their policies and service provision where these have a region-wide
dimension, would entail little expenditure by the regional level of government
(Constitution Unit, 1996a). Moreover, given the structure envisaged for the
Chambers, which would be controlled by delegates from the constituent local
authorities, and the fact that the Chambers’ spending would largely reflect
functions transferred from local government, it would seem logical to finance the
Chambers by allowing them to precept on the council tax base in a similar way
to some other multi-authority agencies (the former Inner London Education
Authority, police authorities, etc.).
Regional governments to which major spending responsibilities had been
transferred from central government could, in principle, be financed wholly
through `block grant’ transfers from central government. Whether, in addition,
regions should have tax-raising powers depends fundamentally on the role that
regional government is intended to perform. Independent powers of taxation
would give scope for autonomy in regional decisions about the level of provision
of public services; also, a clear link between the service level chosen and the tax
burden on regional residents is an essential element of accountability if regional
government is to have the power to decide to spend more (or less). If, instead,
the purpose of regional government is simply to provide more democratic input,
and more- informed control, over the regional implementation of nationally-Format of Fiscal Studies articles
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determined services, regional taxes are unnecessary. In Section V, we outlined
three plausible candidates for a regional tax — income tax, sales tax (based
perhaps on VAT) and a regional business rate. Of these, regional income
taxation (with regional control limited to variation of the basic rate) is perhaps
the most attractive option, combining (relatively) uncomplicated additional
administration requirements with a relatively limited risk of economic distortions
from regional differences in the tax rate.
How are these issues affected if regional government is to be introduced into
only part of the UK, or in different regions at different times? Such ‘variable
geometry’ in regional government would seem likely to impose additional
constraints on the design of a system of regional finance. There could, for
example, be implications for the costs of administration of the system. A
considerable proportion of the administration costs involved in new
arrangements for decentralised finance might be incurred if decentralised
arrangements were introduced in any region; for example, the need for an
administrative mechanism for determining the region in which a taxpayer is
resident arises as soon as any region is given powers to vary the rate of income
tax on its residents.
However, the most significant issue concerning variable geometry is that the
basis of financing regional governments could affect the interests of particular
regions in participating in devolution. Unless the outcome of regional decisions
about regional government is to be unduly influenced by the financial gains or
losses that might be anticipated, extensive equalisation in relation to both needs
and resources is a pressing requirement. Otherwise, those regions most favoured
by the financial arrangements for regional government will tend to opt for
regional powers, leaving the remainder of the UK facing a more adverse
relationship between tax revenues and spending than at present.
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